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A B S T R A C T
Objective: Shared decision-making exists to reconcile healthcare practitioners’ responsibilities to respect
patients’ autonomy whilst ensuring well-made decisions. Patients sometimes make unprompted
requests for procedures that carry medical and other risks, such as risk-reducing mastectomy (RRM).
Faced with pre-formed decisions into which they have had little input, it is unclear how practitioners can
reconcile respecting autonomy with ensuring well-made decisions.
Methods: Qualitative study of linked patient-practitioner interviews in a breast unit in North-West
England. We examined how 10 practitioners addressed 19 patients’ unprompted requests for RRM.
Results: Practitioners empathised with patients’ distress about cancer risk, regarded RRM as legitimate to
help, but were wary of choices made ‘emotionally’. Practitioners did not seek to establish whether
choices were well-made but, instead, ‘warranted’ patients by satisfying themselves that patients were
‘sensible’ and ‘informed’ decision-makers, and thus their decisions could be trusted. Practitioners
provided information, and tested patients’ resolve by delaying decisions and presenting ‘what if’
scenarios depicting failure or harm from RRM.
Conclusion: Patients who present emotionally and with resolution can receive RRM without evidence of a
well-made decision.
Practice Implications: Argumentation theory proposes an ethically robust and clinically practicable
approach, whereby practitioners elicit, examine and, where appropriate, challenge arguments
underpinning patients’ decisions.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Patient Education and Counseling
journal homepage: www.else vie r .com/ locate /pateducou1. Introduction
The idea that patients should inﬂuence their own care shapes
expectations of medical practice [1], expressing a cultural ethic of
autonomy and empowering patients to protect their interests
against dangers of unfettered medical authority [2]. Shared
decision-making (SDM) aims to marry patient participation with
practitioners’ need to ensure that patient choices are clinically
reasonable [3]. As typically portrayed, practitioners present and
explain options to patients. Patients develop preferences based on* Corresponding author at: University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 3BX United
Kingdom.
E-mail address: slbrown@liverpool.ac.uk (S.L. Brown).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2019.03.007
0738-3991/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access artic
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pec.2019.03.007their values and priorities, and negotiate with practitioners to
achieve agreed outcomes [4].
Newer SDM approaches recognise limits on patients’ capacity
to make independent decisions [5]. Choices are often unfamiliar
and technically complex, or made while emotionally distressed.
Thus, preferences can be labile, weakly-held, or inconsistent with
patients’ values. Where patients do not make good decisions
through careful integration of reasonable assumptions about
relevant potential outcomes, arguably their autonomy is weak-
ened because choices may not be linked to their values and
priorities [6–8]. Hence, Cribb and Entwistle [5] claim that
clinicians have responsibility to help patients make as good
decisions as possible whilst minimising imposition of clinicians’
own views.
In a context of medical consumerism [9] and online medical
information [10], worried patients sometimes form preferencesle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
n-maker, not the decision: How healthcare practitioners evaluate the
stectomy, Patient Educ Couns (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
Table 1
Patients linked to each practitioner, previous BC and whether genetic mutations
have been identiﬁed, and practitioners’ age, gender and years in practice.
Patients
Patient ID (linked practitioners) Patient Age Patient BC Gene mutation
P2 (S1, GC3)* 35–40 No No
P3 (S1, GC2) 60–65 Yes Yes
P14 (S1) 46–50 No Yes
P16 (S1) 26–30 No Yes
P19 (S1) 36–40 Yes Yes
P22 (S1, GC4) 60–64 Yes Yes
P1 (S2) 46–50 Yes Yes
P8 (S2) 46–50 Yes Yes
P4 (S3, GC3) 25–30 Yes No
P5 (S3) 46–50 Yes No
P9 (S3) 46–50 Yes No
P10 (S3) 46–50 Yes No
P11 (S1, GC1) 46–50 Yes No
P15 (S3) 41–45 Yes No
P18 (S3) 51–55 Yes No
P7 (S4) 56–60 Yes Yes
P12 (S4) 46–50 Yes No
P27 (S5) 46–50 No Yes
P23 (S1, GC5) 41–45 Yes No
Practitioners
Practitioner Practitioner Age Practitioner Gender Years in Practice
S1 51–55 M 12
S2 40–45 F 8
S3 61–65 M 20
S4 41–45 F 15
S5 51–55 M 18
GC1 46–50 F 5
GC2 46–50 F 9
GC3 46–50 F 11
GC4 51–55 M 25
GC5 41–45 F 12
N1** 56–60 F 30
N2** 46–50 F 7
* P2 had a familial BC history but gene testing was uninformative. She was
considered to have a high-risk of mutation.
** N1 or N2 saw all patients individually, usually before GCs and surgeons.
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interventions [11]. This creates a dilemma for practitioners, who
have been unable to follow the SDM process of selecting and
explaining suitable options. Further, having been excluded from
patients’ decision-making they are less able to evaluate whether a
decision has been well made [12]. Yet, practitioners must decide
between moral risks of denying patients’ well-chosen requests,
and clinical risks of agreeing to interventions that patients have
not chosen well.
A clinical problem that focuses this tension arises when women
request risk reducing mastectomy (RRM), the irreversible surgical
removal of healthy breasts to reduce breast cancer risk. RRM
reduces risk of new cancer for most women [13,14], but reduces
breast cancer mortality only in those with a high probability of
BRCA1/2 gene mutation [15]. RRM is controversial in exposing
healthy women to surgical risk and possible adverse effects on self-
perceived appearance and sexuality [16]. In one study [17] of
women requesting RRM after BC, almost all initiated the request,
and almost none considered important factors such as the
magnitude of cancer or surgical risk [see also 18,19].
In the present study, our immediate aim was to illuminate the
dilemma that patients’ unprompted requests for RRM present to
practitioners; that is, how to balance respect for patients’ requests
with the need to ensure that decisions about whether to proceed to
surgery are well-considered. Our overall aim was to identify
implications for SDM theory.
2. Method
2.1. Design
We took the approach of Kleinman [20]: that a starting point for
researching ethical dilemmas is to understand how actors
routinely approach and negotiate them. We therefore interviewed
patients and their practitioners about how each approached the
decision about RRM and reached the ﬁnal decision. Using a cross-
linked design we could understand the perspective of each party
[21]. As our aims were inductive, we used qualitative methods. We
interpreted our ﬁndings in light of ethical and decision-making
theories.
2.2. Setting
The study was in a university teaching hospital surgical unit
that performs bilateral RRM (BRRM – excision of both breasts) and
contralateral RRM (CRRM – removal of the contralateral breast in
cancer survivors) and a linked clinical genetics unit. All patients
were discussed by a multidisciplinary team including breast
nurses, geneticists and surgeons, often after referral to the genetics
unit for an opinion. Clinical responsibility for the ﬁnal decision
rested with a surgeon. BRRM and some CRRM candidates were
externally referred to the clinic or genetics unit or seen as relatives
of existing patients. Other CRRM candidates were BC patients
treated by the surgical unit, who had discussed RRM with a
practitioner during or after treatment. UK clinical guidance [22]
speciﬁes that women may be offered RRM if at high risk of a genetic
mutation. There was no other institutional guidance.
2.3. Recruitment
Patients were recruited from October 2013 to March 2015. We
sampled patients purposively from surgery lists to include BRRM
and CRRM patients of varying ages, and CRRM patients with and
without BRCA1/2 mutations. We tried to recruit patients who
requested, but did not receive, RRM by asking practitioners to recall
such consultations during the interview period. PractitionersPlease cite this article in press as: S.L. Brown, et al., Warranting the decisio
legitimacy of patients’ unprompted requests for risk-reducing ma
pec.2019.03.007recalled none and, in their interviews, recalled few patients ever
changing their minds. We interviewed the surgeon involved in
RRM decisions for each patient and genetic counsellors (GCs)
where appropriate. Two breast care nurses routinely saw all
patients on the surgical unit but were without a speciﬁc role in
patients’ decision-making. Hence, they were interviewed once at
the end of data collection where they reﬂected on their practice in
general and on speciﬁc patients (Table 1).
2.4. Procedure
North-West England Research Ethics Service (13/NW/0421)
approved the study. Patients participated in face-to-face semi-
structured interviews as soon as possible after the consultation in
which surgeons agreed to RRM. Interviews were in patients’
homes or private spaces in the surgical unit, as each patient
preferred. Interviewers had been previously trained in qualitative
interviewing and were further trained by the investigators for this
project. An interview guide prompted exploration of: how
patients arrived at their preference for RRM; what they wanted
from consultation; what they understood was the practitioner’s
role in the consultation; and their perspective on how the
decision was reached. The interviewer used open questions,
prompts and reﬂection to achieve a conversational style, probing
as appropriate. We previously reported how patients arrived at
their preferences [23]. Here we report their accounts of the
consultation and decision.n-maker, not the decision: How healthcare practitioners evaluate the
stectomy, Patient Educ Couns (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
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view about each of their study patients, in private ofﬁces in the clinic
as soon as possible after the interview with the relevant patient
(breast-care nurses were interviewed once). In the ﬁrst interview
with each practitioner, we explored their general approach to RRM
decisions, allowing them to talk freely while seeking to anchor
discussion in speciﬁc cases and experiences to avoid over-general-
ized or idealized accounts. An interview guide prompted the
interviewer to explore: how practitioners found that RRM arose in
consultations; how they responded to patients’ requests for RRM and
what inﬂuenced their response; whether and in what ways they
were concerned with, or tried to assess or inﬂuence, how patients
formed their preferences; and how the ﬁnal decision was reached.
Then, for surgeons and GCs, discussion of speciﬁc study patients was
informed by the interviewer’s preliminary listening to the recording,
or reading the transcript, of the patient’s account. Practitioners were
asked about how they approached the decision, how they under-
stood and responded to the patient’s position, and how the ﬁnal
decisionwasreached. Ininterviewingpractitioners,weprotectedthe
conﬁdentiality of what their patients had told us by ensuring that we
did not disclose any element of the patient’s account. Where
necessary, practitioners were interviewed repeatedly as further
patients became available.
2.5. Data analysis
Analysis drew on a pluralist approach, in which we sought
‘methodological integrity’ by adopting practices that ensured
ﬁdelity to data and utility for the research question [24,25]. To
examine the linked accounts of patients and practitioners, we used
the method we described previously [21]. Initially, we worked at
the level of each case, reading the linked accounts and developing a
narrative synthesis of the case. We produced an evolving summary,
modiﬁed after examining each case sequentially, and referring
back as necessary to previously analysed cases, highlighting areas
of consistency and inconsistency between and within cases, and
elaborating, organizing and linking the emerging analytic catego-
ries so that the analysis developed iteratively, following a constant
comparative approach [26]. We used Microsoft Word to label and
organize text using evolving inductive headings [27].
SB led the analysis, reading all scripts and developing initial
analytic categories. The analysis was discussed regularly amongst
SB, PSalmon and PSaini, who also read all transcripts, and
periodically amongst all authors, who read selected extracts.
Analysis started descriptively but became more interpretative as,
in analysing participants’ statements, we took account of the
context provided by the rest of their interview, by the other party’s
relevant interview, and by the developing analysis. We attended to
possible functions of what was said, including the possibility that
accounts contained justiﬁcations and rationalisations, or for-
getting or deliberate deletion of information. We were alert to
possible sources of heterogeneity in analysis, particularly between
patients who had and had not been diagnosed with BC, and
between practitioners with different professional roles and
responsibilities. As analysis proceeded, we continually judged it
according to consensus validity (through debate, it should satisfy
all authors [28]), reﬂexive validity (it should change authors’ initial
and subsequent views [28]), catalytic validity (it should have
potential practice implications [28,29]), and theoretical validity (it
should inform theory [28]). Analysis ended when further discus-
sion and reference to data did not appreciably change it
(‘theoretical saturation’).
Key ﬁndings are illustrated by italicised quotes, with ellipses
( . . . ) indicating omitted text, and explanatory comments in
square brackets. The requested procedure is noted in ellipses after
each patient, as is any known BRCA mutation.Please cite this article in press as: S.L. Brown, et al., Warranting the decisio
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3.1. Overview
All patients reported resolutely wanting RRM, whilst practi-
tioners described being cautious because of its severity and
questionable clinical beneﬁt for some patients. Patients presented
emotive cases for RRM, and practitioners empathised with their
distress. However, practitioners faced a paradox; they wanted to
ease patients’ distress but were concerned about the validity of
patients’ ‘emotional’ decision-making. Practitioners’ solution was
to warrant the patient as ‘sensible’ and ‘informed’ rather than
assessing the merits of the decision.
3.2. Patients were resolute in wanting RRM, but practitioners were
cautious
Patients’ accounts were characterised by their resolve for RRM.
Before consultation all had decided they wanted RRM, and none
described considering a change of mind at any point during the
consultation or since. For example, P18 (CRRM) found recovery
from mastectomy painful, but her determination to obtain RRM
was unaffected: ‘I am still as determined, I want it done. I have not
changed my decision in any way. Even after the [mastectomy]
surgery, I was concerned that it was going to be that horrible that I
wouldn’t, you know, want to go through that again, but I would rather
go through that than chemo and be vomiting.’ Patients described
being resolute in consultations with practitioners. P11 (CRRM)
described needing to be determined to overcome perceived staff
inertia or resistance: ‘Yeah, it was always me kind of pushing for
things, yeah, because I’m just like that . . . I don’t think I would have
been offered it at all. I don’t think it would have been discussed.’
By contrast, practitioners explained that RRM is a major
procedure with signiﬁcant risks of harm, which requires careful
justiﬁcation. Several cited clinical guidance [22] that RRM be
offered only to women at high genetic risk. Talking about P11, S1
stated; ‘it’s (RRM) not without its risks, and I think if you are going
outside very clear, prescriptive guidelines, those guidelines are there
for good reason, at the end of the day, this is healthy tissue you know
that is being removed.’.
3.3. Practitioners empathised with patients’ distress, but were
concerned about their ‘emotional’ decision-making
In interviews, patients explained their pursuit of RRM by
describing their worry about future BC. They freely described
trying to convey the intensity of these feelings to practitioners
when they discussed RRM: ‘I think for, for someone who doesn’t
know what my family history is and, and how much worry I’ve had
throughout my whole life about it . . . Some people I don’t really think
they understand . . . and it’s quite hard trying to explain to someone
without being dramatic that, you know, it, it is for a really good
reason.’(P16, BRRM, BRCA+).
In turn, every practitioner empathised with patients’ worry as a
reasonforseekingRRM.Forexample,N1describedanon-studypatient
who ‘has had a really traumatic time, mother’s died when they were quite
young, they’ve been through it all and they would see that breast cancer in
any shape or form as being the absolute thing to be avoided at all costs’.
Similarly, S2 described his reaction to P1 who wanted RRM because
of her anxiety during appointments for mammography screening; ‘I
was empathic with her situation, that she was very young, she’s got a
young family and she did struggle quite signiﬁcantly with her
treatment . . . I think some people, not particularly this patient, ﬁnd
it very difﬁcult to come back from mammograms . . . they worry a lot
about having a mammogram and then having biopsies again, and that
kind of takes over their ability to have quite a quality of life’.n-maker, not the decision: How healthcare practitioners evaluate the
stectomy, Patient Educ Couns (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
Box 1. Discrepant cases Two practitioners referred to clinical guidance in rejecting emotionally-motivated requests.
N1 recounted a patient (not in the study) who wanted RRM but did not meet guidance criteria*, describing the emotional ‘effort’ of
resisting the request: ‘We haven’t got a system that allows me to say “OK, that’s ﬁne, I think it’s ﬁne for you to have your breast
tissue removed for that level of risk” . . . But emotionally then, you can feel a bit wrung out at the end of a session when
somebody’s wanting something desperately and you’re not going to give it to them and you’re trying to say “Well, you know, the
chances of you getting breast cancer at this level”, that doesn’t really mean anything when in their head that’s the worst possible
outcome’(N1).
GC3 described reluctance to refer patients to the multi-disciplinary team who did not meet guidance. Nevertheless she differed
from N1 in that she made some exceptions, ‘If there are people that are really, really, really struggling, and I think I have only done it
a couple of times, I will take their notes and discuss them at the clinic. But I have done that rarely because I think it is just undue
pressure [on surgeons to offer RRM].’(GC3).
* Clinical guidance (CG164 [22]) in the UK recommends that RRM be offered only to women with high risk of BRCA1/2 mutations.
This guidance is less explicit for women who are not high risk of BRCA1/2 mutations.
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lay outside clinical guidance (Box 1), most regarded distress as a
reason to agree to RRM, even where guidance criteria were unmet.
GC4, for example, was explicit that RRM could resolve patients’
continuing sense of vulnerability after BC: ‘I certainly believe in
holistic medicine in terms of, it’s not just a risk, it’s impact, it’s living
with it, it’s perception of risk’.
However, all practitioners mistrusted decisions that they
regarded as having been made ‘emotionally’ rather than ‘rationally’.
For example, S3 described how personal or family experiences
with BC, and their emotional impact, could be more important in
patients’ decisions than information from practitioners: ‘It’s
[having BC] a very powerful experience . . . It’s more powerful than
me saying “The percentage is this, the percentage is that.”’(S3). S3
continued, explaining that many patients do not decide rationally:
‘I think a lot of the decision-making that goes on is much more
emotional than we think. There is this whole thing of, I mean the
current paradigm within the NHS, and modern society, is that we have
a whole load of logical people, logical, rational, well-informed,
intelligent people who make logical, rational, well-informed intelli-
gent decisions. Mostly that’s not true. You know mostly we have a load
of scared, worried, ill-informed people who don’t understand the
pathology, don’t understand the risks’ (S3).
Similarly, GC3 described her difﬁculty with women who: ‘are so
ﬁxed in their view it is difﬁcult to have a useful conversation with
them . . . They are just so ﬁxed that they can’t accept a lot of
challenge around that. And I remember one particular patient .
. . went for a predictive test solely because she wanted to have risk
reducing surgery, no other reason. She wouldn’t really engage too
much in the pre-test counselling, she just wanted the test to show
she was positive so she could have the risk reducing surgery. And
she was always a worry.’(GC3).
3.4. How practitioners reconciled empathy for patients’ distress with
distrust for ‘emotional’ decision-making: ‘warranting’ the patient
Despite their explicit concerns that the ‘emotional’ nature of
patients’ decisions to seek RRM was a reason for not acquiescing,
no practitioner identiﬁed any study patient as having made an
‘emotional’ decision. Instead they uniformly described their
patients as ‘well informed’ and ‘sensible’. Practitioners’ interviews
suggested how they moved from general mistrust of patients’
‘emotional’ decision-making to endorsing speciﬁc patients as ‘well
informed’ and ‘sensible’. Crucially, they did not examine how
patients actually made decisions. Although they routinely asked
why patients wanted RRM and checked that patients were aware of
the implications for surgical risk and living with a mastectomy,
there was no evidence that practitioners probed whether patients
had considered the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of RRM or whether and how
they had weighed these different considerations. S1, indeed, wasPlease cite this article in press as: S.L. Brown, et al., Warranting the decisio
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role: ‘She had already made a decision to have surgery. My role
was . . . not to help her make a decision . . . she has come to wanting
surgery so I, I don’t think I had any role in initiating or . . . helping her
make a decision. But what I think I helped with was a clear
understanding of what’s to be expected from the surgery.’
Instead, practitioners ‘warranted’ patients as capable of making
good decisions. Warranting had four elements, the ﬁrst used by all
practitioners, the others used only by surgeons who were
responsible for the RRM decision (see Table 2). First, all
practitioners ensured that patients had received information
about RRM, including associated risks and available alternatives
including chemoprevention and monitoring. Second, adopting a
term used to describe medical contraindications, surgeons assured
themselves that patients did not present ‘red ﬂags’ – mental health
or other problems that might compromise their ability to make
sensible decisions. Third, surgeons challenged patients to consider
‘what if’ scenarios in which RRM led to adverse outcomes or failed
to prevent cancer. Finally, surgeons ‘tested’ patients’ resolve by
delaying the RRM decision to ensure that their motivation was not
transient.
Patients’ reactions to clinicians’ warranting varied. Some
described these strategies appreciatively, as helping them make
a ‘more balanced’ (P11, CRRM) decision; ‘It was the right decision for
S3 to make me wait, because I think had I have done it ﬁrst, at the same
time, I might have regrets’ (P9, CRRM). Others experienced them as
obstructions to be overcome. When asked whether information
had been helpful, P4 replied: ‘No, they’re just guessing. “Wait for this,
wait for that”. So I put my foot down. “Well I’ve come off the
medication now so you’ve got to do it.”’ (P4, CRRM). Similarly P12
(BRRM), having requested RRM immediately after BC diagnosis,
described the surgeon’s delay as resistance: ‘[S4] said to me . . .
which she then reiterated at my appointment after the surgery, which
was that she’d like six months if at all possible between . . . It was like,
“Oh shit, it goes on for another six months”. “No” I said, “This is what I
want” . . . So I had made it very clear that this was, this was going to
happen, and [S4] I think realised how serious that, that it was’.
4. Discussion and conclusion
4.1. Discussion
Faced with patients who were distressed and wanted RRM,
practitioners generally acceded. However, patients’ distress
presented practitioners with a paradox. While regarding RRM as
a clinically appropriate way to reduce distress, practitioners were
cautious about acceding to decisions that patients had reached
‘emotionally’. In resolving this paradox practitioners were reluc-
tant to evaluate, or intervene in, patients’ decision-making.
Instead, they sought to ‘warrant’ the decision-maker as beingn-maker, not the decision: How healthcare practitioners evaluate the
stectomy, Patient Educ Couns (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
Table 2
Practitioners’ Strategies for ‘Warranting’ Patients as ‘Informed’ and ‘Sensible’ Decision-Makers.
Strategy Description Illustrative quotation
Information
Provision
Practitioners gave patients necessary information, tailored to what they saw
as common misconceptions about RRM.
‘I emphasise, double-emphasise, and they understand the surgery is risk
reduction, not risk elimination, because some people think “Oh, if I have this
mastectomy that’s the end of the story, I’ll never have breast cancer”. That is not
true . . . I go over the concept of risk reduction in detail and make sure they
understand that it’s risk reduction and won’t be disappointed in the future.’(S1).
‘Red Flags’ Alertness to patients wanting RRM for reasons other than risk reduction,
such as breast enhancement, or problems including body dysmorphia or
factitious disorders.
‘A patient who has come with lots of surgery for lumps and bumps, and all the
histology that we reviewed was all benign but they were requesting bilateral
prophylactic mastectomies. And no, I didn’t think that sounded right either,
because they had around eight [biopsy] surgeries and none of those were atypia,
so you do wonder about something else going on in the background’(S4).
Adverse
Scenarios
Presenting ‘worst-case’ outcomes of RRM, such as where metastatic cancer
may occur after RRM.
‘Breast cancer is sneaky, it can come back ten/twenty years somewhere else, after
your original surgery, and how would you feel, and I do put it quite speciﬁc, how
would you feel if you have this surgery . . . I usually say if you are having a
reconstruction it is three months recovery afterwards, how would they feel if,
after all of that, they got a recurrence somewhere else?’(S4).
Slowing the
Decision
Surgeons postponed the decision to allow patients time to reconsider,
particularly when patients asked surgeons for BRRM immediately after BC
diagnosis
‘We try and stall them. Not stop them, just stall them.’(S4).
She was convinced of what she wanted to do. I delayed that for her. She would
have . . . well her express wish was to do it, remove both breasts at the same
time. So I delayed that and essentially stuck to our protocol.’(S3 responding to
P11’s request for BRRM directly after diagnosis).
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that practitioners are concerned about whether patients can be
trusted to undertake complex decisions [30], but this is the ﬁrst to
our knowledge that describes, and evaluates ethical and clinical
implications of, strategies practitioners use to establish trust in
patients’ decisions.
The deﬁning elements of the paradox that practitioners faced
are grounded in broader ethical aspects of clinical practice. First,
RRM can reduce patients’ distress and fear of cancer [31], whereas
there is little evidence that alternative risk-reduction procedures
can. Practitioners therefore saw a case for using surgery for
psychological beneﬁts that probably could not be realized more
conservatively. Ethical arguments in favour of surgery for
psychological reasons have also been made in clinical areas
including bariatric and cosmetic surgery [32,33]. Second, practi-
tioners’ mistrust of emotional decision-making reﬂects a broader
cultural and clinical emphasis on patients making informed and
well-thought out decisions about their care [5,8,12].
Guidance about practitioners’ role in patients’ decision-
making offers little help in resolving the paradox they faced.
Practitioners in this study satisﬁed guidance to ensure that
patients had the information they needed, and considered
options and their consequences [12]. However, SDM literature
does not yet provide explicit guidance about how patients should
consider and balance these options and consequences [8]. That is,
SDM regards decision-making as a ‘black box’, to be managed and
evaluated with reference to the inputs, such as practitioners’
explanation of patients’ options, and is less concerned with what
happens inside the box.
In our study, practitioners also seemed to regard patients’
decision-making as a black box inasmuch as they did not
scrutinize patients’ decision-making. Instead, they warranted
patients as ‘well-informed’ and ‘sensible’ decision-makers. Whilst
resolving the paradox for practitioners, warranting patients
potentially introduces inequity. In particular, warranting favours
patients who communicate distress most compellingly and
consistently [17]. These might include the very patients that
practitioners were concerned were making emotional decisions.
Moreover, patients who are sufﬁciently determined to withstand
practitioners’ warranting strategies, and in whom fears or hopes
overwhelm consideration of evidence might well be making
decisions that disregard information they have received. There-
fore, if practitioners rely solely on warranting patients, this would
be hard to defend ethically.Please cite this article in press as: S.L. Brown, et al., Warranting the decisio
legitimacy of patients’ unprompted requests for risk-reducing ma
pec.2019.03.0074.2. Practice implications
Recent introduction of argumentation theory into SDM offers
an alternative solution to practitioners’ dilemmas [34]. Argumen-
tation theory describes the ethical responsibility for practitioners
and patients to provide clear arguments for their preferences, and
to elicit and take account of the reasons for the other party’s views.
In other words, practitioners are expected to respect but also
critically evaluate patients’ decisions. Importantly, evidence from
trials recruitment shows that practitioners’ skilful exploration of
patients’ preferences can elicit, and help patients to clarify, their
arguments and expose the logic of their positions [35]. Conversely,
evidence from primary care shows that patients are more likely to
consider the views of practitioners who provide evidence-based
and logical arguments for their own positions [36]. Use of
argumentation is consistent with recent bioethics literature that
argues that practitioners sometimes need to be active in helping
patients make better decisions [5,8]. In RRM, an argumentation
approach could start with practitioners asking patients to explain
how they developed their preferences, allowing practitioners to
judge the evidence-base and logic of patients’ reasoning, and to
challenge this with counter-arguments if necessary.
Whether an argumentation approach could lead some patients
to change their minds, particularly those whose decisions were
based on emotion or misapprehensions or were poorly reasoned is
for future work to discover. Practitioners might, however, change
their own decisions. They might, for example, reverse an initial
decision to accede to RRM where they expose patients’ unrealistic
arguments. Even where decisions are unchanged, they would
arguably be more defensible ethically inasmuch as patients would
have understood and reviewed available options, and patients and
practitioners would have each made their arguments explicit.
Although practitioners’ reliance on warranting patients seems
generally to deliver patients the surgery that they seek, it is
questionable to regard this as protecting patients’ autonomy. The
corollary of practitioners’ reliance on warranting is that patients
obtain surgery by presenting emotional distress and by with-
standing practitioners’ ‘tests’, yet they might not have seriously
considered the consequences or alternatives. Recent ideas of
relational autonomy recognize that patients’ choices are inherently
constrained by context and that autonomy lies, not in the
frequently unrealistic ethic of self-determination, but in interper-
sonal relationships, particularly with practitioners, which support
patients and help them develop capacity to participate in decisionsn-maker, not the decision: How healthcare practitioners evaluate the
stectomy, Patient Educ Couns (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
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PEC 6218 No. of Pages 6[21]. From this perspective, an argumentation approach is a
practicable way to protect and enhance patient autonomy in
decisions, such as those about RRM, where patients seek
interventions that have uncertain beneﬁts or serious risks.
4.3. Limitations
Although there were no institutional constraints on practitioners’
decision-making, thestudysurgicalandclinicalgeneticsunitsshareda
practice culture, and the ways inwhich practitioners approached RRM
might not apply elsewhere. As we were unable to predict patients’
requests for RRM, we could not obtain transcripts of consultations in
which RRM was discussed, and therefore do not deﬁnitively know
what was said. Our ﬁndings are thus reliant on retrospective accounts.
It is possible, for example, that clinicians might have discussed
patients’ preferences in greater depth than interview responses
indicated. Some patients who request RRM might change their minds.
However, we could not identify such patients during the study period
and thus could not study how views about RRM might change.
4.4. Conclusion
Although from the UK health-care system, our ﬁndings are
potentially relevant to any system where practitioners have
responsibility for decisions about invasive treatments, such as
RRM, that patients request. Indeed, they may be particularly relevant
for more consumer-focussed health-care systems. Current con-
ceptualisations of SDM do not describe how practitioners and
patients should come to shared decisions that balance patients’
wishes for such procedures with ensuring that their preferences are
evidence-based and well-reasoned. By obliging both patients and
practitioners to describe reasoning underlying their preferences, an
argumentation approach to SDM would open the ‘black box’ of
individuals’ preference formation and allow practitioners and
patients to ‘share’ clinical decisions in ways that protect and extend
patient autonomy whilst ensuring that decisions are well-made.
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